terrance anderson
Terrance Anderson, Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. banc 2006)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Voir Dire)
Terrance Anderson was convicted and sentenced to death for killing Debbie Rainwater, the maternal grandmother of his child. In state post-conviction, the Missouri Supreme Court granted Mr. Anderson a new penalty phase trial, finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike a juror who stated that he would vote for a death sentence unless defense counsel could convince him otherwise. That juror had demonstrated his inability to be impartial, the Court reasoned, by putting the burden on defense to convince him that Mr. Anderson did not deserve the death penalty. Anderson, 196 S.W.3d at 40-41. Nothing in the record reflected any reasonable strategy for failing to move to strike and counsel even admitted that their failure to do so was the result of a note-taking error. Id. at 40-41. Because the failure to remove a juror with an “improper predisposition” is structural error, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the death sentence imposed by the tainted jury must be reversed. Id. at 40.
Terrance Anderson, Anderson v. State, 402 S.W.3d 86 (Mo. banc 2013) (retrial)
Judicial Misconduct/Bias
After Mr. Anderson was again sentenced to death at his penalty-phase retrial, he moved for post-conviction relief. Mr. Anderson argued that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to call a psychiatrist and neurologist at the penalty retrial to testify about mitigation relating to brain damage from the circumstances of his birth, his mother’s history of epilepsy, and prior neurological testing showing abnormalities. The judge assigned to hear his Rule 29.15 motion, Judge William Syler, had presided over Mr. Anderson’s initial trial, his initial Rule 29.15 motion hearing, and his retrial. The judge made statements on and off the record suggesting that he had relied on extrajudicial evidence and prejudged the mental health evidence that Mr. Anderson was seeking to develop in state post-conviction. On the record, the judge stated that he did not “buy any of it,” and that he had spoken off the record with the foreperson of the first jury who said the jury did not believe the mental health evidence presented at the guilt phase. Anderson, 402 S.W.3d at 89-90. Off the record, the judge commented that the defense mental health expert who testified at the guilt phase—and who, Mr. Anderson argued, trial counsel should have called to testify at the penalty phase—was a frequent flyer with the Missouri Public Defender system and was not believable. Mr. Anderson filed a motion to recuse. Judge Syler denied the recusal motion and ultimately denied Mr. Anderson’s Rule 29.15 motion.
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the judge to sustain Mr. Anderson’s recusal motion, finding that “[s]omeone not acquainted with the judge’s record of integrity, which is evidenced by his openness regarding his conversations with the foreperson, reasonably could believe that his decision to overrule Mr. Anderson’s Rule 29.15 motion was influenced by the information obtained outside the judicial proceedings in Mr. Anderson’s case.” Id. at 94.