Carman deck
Carman Deck, Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. 2002)
Carman Deck was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1996 murders of James and Zelma Long during a robbery of the couple after they let him into their home to give him directions. On appeal from the denial of Mr. Deck’s 29.15 motion, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed his death sentence.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Penalty Phase (Jury Instructions on Mitigating Evidence)
At the penalty phase of trial, counsel requested two jury instructions on non-statutory mitigation, and the judge refused them both. Counsel had no alternative instructions ready, so form instructions from the Missouri Approved Instructions were printed from the court’s computer. Counsel failed to notice that the last two paragraphs of the instructions did not print and incomplete instructions were given to the jury. The two missing paragraphs would have told the jurors that they must consider circumstances in mitigation of punishment and that they need not be unanimous in their findings on mitigation.
Mr. Deck raised this claim as trial error on direct appeal and the Missouri Supreme Court found no plain error. In 29.15 proceedings, Mr. Deck asserted counsel’s ineffectiveness for offering instructions that omitted these two crucial paragraphs.
On appeal from the denial of Mr. Deck’s 29.15 motion, the Missouri Supreme Court held that, because “the major focus of Mr. Deck’s defense . . . was the existence of mitigating circumstances,” and Mr. Deck in fact offered “substantial mitigating evidence” at trial, the paragraphs missing from the jury instructions were central to Mr. Deck’s defense. Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 430-431. In finding that Mr. Deck was entitled to relief under the Strickland standard even where he had not been entitled to relief under the heightened plain error standard, the Court was persuaded by the fact that notes from the jurors showed they were focused on mitigation and had expressed confusion about the issue. Id. at 431. The Court also noted that defense counsel failed to give the jurors an explanation of the concept of mitigation during voir dire, making them especially dependent on the instructions. 68 S.W.3d at 430. In conclusion, “counsel’s professional incompetence in failing to include the two mitigation paragraphs or to object to their absence was so egregious as to entitle Mr. Deck to a new penalty phase trial.” 68 S.W.3d at 431.
Carman Deck, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005)
Due Process Violation (Shackling) Carman Deck was sentenced to death again at his second penalty trial. This time, his case reached the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether the visible shackles he wore during his sentencing trial violated the Federal Constitution. The Court held that the three fundamental legal principles underlying the prohibition on routine shackling during the guilt-innocence trial “apply with like force” to capital penalty trials. 544 U.S. at 630-632. First, “[v]isible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process;” second, shackles and other physical restraints interfere with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and third, the judicial process must be dignified, “which includes the respectful treatment of defendants,” and visible shackling undermines that objective. With regard to the first principle, the Court held that although the presumption of innocence no longer applies at the penalty phase of a capital proceeding, the decision between life and death, “given the ‘severity’ and ‘finality’ of the sanction, is no less important than the decision about guilt,” and “[n]either is accuracy in making that decision any less critical.” Id. at 632.
The Constitutional requirement is not absolute. A judge, in their discretion, is permitted “to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for shackling,” but any such determination must be specific to the defendant on trial. 544 U.S. at 633. That requirement was not met in Mr. Deck’s case. The trial judge made no findings on the need for shackling Mr. Deck; the only stated reason for imposing the shackles was that Mr. Deck had already been convicted. Id. at 634. There was also evidence in the record that the shackles Mr. Deck wore were visible to the jury. Because shackling is inherently prejudicial and the prejudicial effects ‘‘cannot be shown from a trial transcript,’’ a defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation where the judge orders the defendant to wear visible shackles without adequate justification. Id. at 635.